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Abstract
I use the STAN database of the OECD and different econometric methods
to investigate the effects of exports towards the EU-15 on wages in the Visegrad
countries (CEEC-4; Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia).
The results do not allow to draw any deﬁnite statements about this effect.
While the impact of exports towards the EU-15 on wages in the countries inves-
tigated is likely to be negative in the short run (1-2 years), it seems to be positive
in the medium and long run, at least for Hungary and Poland.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the pattern of the CEEC-4 exports towards the
EU-15 does not correspond with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Therefore, also the theorems of Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and concern-
ing the equalization of factor prices, which are based on the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, do not seem accurate to describe the underlying forces linking trade
with factor prices.
1PhD candidate at the Georg-August University G¨ ottingen, Germany. Current research: Empir-
ical Aspects of the Effects of Transnational Corporations on Economic Development. The present
paper is a summary of his diploma thesis in economics at the University of Vienna. The author
would like to thank Arda Kostem, Wendelin Moritz, Stefan Sperlich, Walter Zucchini, and espe-
cially Neil Foster for comments on various earlier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer
applies.
1I argue that missing regional and related inter-sectoral labor mobility might
be a potential factor preventing employees from taking advantage of trade
liberalization. To substantiate this suspicion, however, analysis of more disaggre-
gated data is necessary.
Keywords: panel data, EU enlargement, trade, wages, factor prices, in-
come distribution, Central and Eastern Europe, Visegrad Countries
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2Introduction
The Stolper-Samuelson (1941) and the factor prize equalization (FPE; Samuel-
son, 1948 and 1949) theorem predict that after the transition from an autarky
to a free trade equilibrium under certain assumptions, the income of the rela-
tively abundant factor of the country will rise and factor prizes will be equal-
ized among trading partners. While there is no need for a logically proven
theorem to be empirically tested, this paper aims for testing the correlation
between trade and wages in the actual process of four Central and Eastern
European Countries’ (CEECs) accession to the EU-15 rather than within the per-
fect Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model. It is investigated, whether the
predicted mechanisms of the latter account for the actual behavior of factor
prices in this process. I ﬁnd serious limitations of the explanatory power of the
HOS model to describe the dynamics of factor prices and provide weak evi-
dence for differences in the trade-income relationship between Hungary and
Poland on the one side and Czech Republic and Slovakia on the other hand.
Finally, I pose possible explanations for these ﬁndings.
1 Institutional and theoretical background
After the breakdown of centrally planned economies in Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean Countries (CEECs), there was widespread hope for a “return to Europe”
(cf. Segert, 2002: ch. 1) which included not only an institutional but also a social
perspective. The macro response to the implemented stabilization programs,
however, was at least disappointing. On the micro level, workers experienced
a dramatic increase of unemployment.
One might argue thus that the transition environment is a too shaky ground
to investigate the trade-income relationship. When considering economic pro-
cesses to happen within a perfect model, this objection might have something
going for it. Realistically, some arguments mitigate this “best world” view. First
of all, it is pretty seldom, that a government only liberalizes foreign trade but
leaves all other policy parameters unchanged.2 Furthermore, by 1997 - the ﬁrst
2Having this in mind, it is surprising, how little economic theory on the role of trade liberaliza-
3year of the present analysis - the CEEC-4 have mainly stabilized economically
and politically: In Poland, GDP p.c. was 29,4 % above its (low) 1990 level, in
Czech Republic and Hungary it amounted to 96.6 % and 99.1 % of its 1990 level,
respectively. Only in Slovakia, GDP p.c. lagged more than 10 % behind its 1990
level.3
Finally, we have seldom observed such an extensive liberalization of foreign
trade as it has been the case between the EU and some of the CEECs after
1990, and trade amounts to a signiﬁcant portion of the GDP of the latter. The
legal basis of this trade liberalization were the ‘Europe Agreements’ which re-
placed less extensive agreements on trade and cooperation (cf. Merli/Huster,
2009: 37) and were signed in 1991.4 More precisely, they consisted of an asym-
metric liberalization in goods trade (but not in services or personal mobility),
where the EU abolished non-tariff barriers to trade immediately and tariffs within
ﬁve years while the CEECs had more time to fulﬁll these tasks. Therefore, the ‘Eu-
rope Agreements’ should be seen as probably the most important agreements
on free trade between the CEEC-4 and the EU-12 (by then) until the ‘Accession
Treaties’ (signed April 16, 2003) came into force in 2004, even though goods
considered “sensitive”, such as textiles, coal, and steel, as well as agricultural
goods obtained special treatment5, and furthermore some of the protection
clauses were operated rather pedantic sometimes, and some agreements suf-
fered lacks of realization (cf. Brasche, 2008: 284f, Merli/Huster, 2009: 37f). Finally,
anti-dumping clauses prevented EU markets from too harsh competition (see
Ehrenhaft et al. 1997: esp. ch. 3 on the issue).
tion in the context of transition and/or economic stabilization exists. An exception worth empha-
sizing is the contribution of McKinnon (1993), even though it deals with stabilization in general
and not transition especially (and it makes in fact a difference if markets are distorted or non-
existent). Winiecki (2002), another contribution worth mentioning, agrees that “surprisingly few
[works] have been devoted to surveying the foreign trade issues emerging during the transition
process” (p. 1) but is generally not able to ﬁll this gap even though alluding to some interesting
and central points.
3Own calculations based on Heston et al. (2006). Have in mind that Slovakia had to set up
its own institutions after the separation from Czech Republic in 1993 which might account for
this delay at least partially. If real wages are considered instead of GDP p.c., the story looks a
little different: By 1997 only Czech Republic reached its 1989 level (103.2), whereas real wages
were signiﬁcantly below that level in Poland (83.2) and Hungary (77.9; Nesporova, 1999: 23).
Unemployment rate, on the other hand, has clearly risen: The number of employees fell by 7.6,
11.7, and 27.4 % in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, respecitively (Nesporova, 1999: 8).
Nevertheless, we can consider the unemployment rate as relatively stable at this high level.
4For Czech Republic and Slovakia, the agreement had to be formally renewed in 1993.
5Some authors emphasize that these were especially the sectors where CEECs had com-
parative advantages and economic development was therefore undermined. In fact, goods
considered “sensitive” amounted to about one third in CEEC-4 exports towards the EU-15 in 1991
(cf. Wielgoss, 1997: 85). However, in all these sectors economies of scale are unlikely and even
decreasing returns are possible so that these “barriers” might even have fostered a sustainable
long term development (cf. Raffer, 1994, for a theoretical background).
4What effects of this trade liberalization would we expect for factor prices?
CEECs are usually assumed to be relatively labor abundant (as compared to
the more capital abundant EU-15) which means, according to the Heckscher-
Olin model, that they have a comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive
goods. When in an autarky equilibrium trade with the EU-15 is liberalized, this
would lead to a relative increase in the price of the labor-intensive good.6
This creates incentive to increase the production of this good in CEECs until
marginal production costs equal prices which frees up more capital (from the
capital-intensive sector) than can be employed at the current capital-labor ra-
tio in a new free-trade equilibrium. Therefore, this ratio must fall in all sectors
of the economy which makes capital less scarce while demand for labor rises
which causes the wage rate to rise and capital income to fall.7 Since prices
must be equal in all countries in a free-trade equilibrium, this also leads to an
equalization of factor prices (if additionally no transportation costs and no full
specialization is assumed). The essential “crux” of the whole story is “the unique
correspondence between product price and factor price” (Cline, 1997: 42), i.e.
that the change in factor prices operates through a change in product prices
which will cause a shift of the sectoral distribution of production.
1.1 A short survey of previous studies
Even though the trade-income relationship has received much attention in at-
tempts to explain the rising income inequality in the United States (see Cline,
1997, for a survey), a survey of studies investigating this relationship in CEECs is
rather short despite the fact that trade plays a major role in these countries and
is expected to lead to more favorable outcomes concerning the income distri-
bution.
Onaran and Stockhammer (2006) do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence of trade with the EU on wages in the CEEC-4 plus Slovenia between 2000
and 2004. Breuss (2007) investigates the effect of total trade on the wage share
in ten CEECs and ﬁnds a positive inﬂuence between 1995 and 2005. Thereby,
however, the effect of trade with the EU is negative. Since working in levels of
the series investigated, both studies are likely to suffer from spurious regression
problems (cf. Kao, 1999: 5, theorem 1). Egger and Stehrer (2003) as well as Es-
posito (2003) use a methodically more sophisticated approach by implying the
then fashionable GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) and ﬁnd a pos-
6Goods prices are determined exogenously by the world market.
7This movement will not only be relative to the other factor but absolute in real terms (cf.
Stolper/Samuelson, 1941: 69).
5itive effect of trade in intermediate goods on the unskilled-to-skilled workers’
wage bill in favor of the former. Newell and Socha (1998) focus on distributional
aspects of privatization but do also show that trade with Western Europe, es-
pecially Germany, increased employment and wages in Poland between 1992
and 1996 through a shift in labor demand. The study of Ersado and Milanovic
(2008) uses household surveys to investigate determinants of the income dis-
tribution in 26 CEECs but ﬁnds that trade is neutral in this context. However,
they would use policy variables instead of economic hard facts to measure the
magnitude of trade.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
For my empirical investigation I use data of the OECD database for structural
analysis (STAN) for twelve manufacturing industries (see table 2 in Appendix A)
over the period 1997-20058.
Real wages are calculated by dividing the sum of wages and salaries in-
cluding supplements (such as contributions to social security, private pensions,
health insurance, life insurance etc.) by the number of employees in every
industry. Supplementary to real wages (using CPI indexes from the OECD web-
site) I calculated a EU-reference wage for each of the CEECs individually. These
reference wages are the EU-15 average wages weighted by the CEECs export
shares to these countries (as percentage to the EU-15 in total) and reﬂect the
fact that trade would not equalize CEECs’ wages with the EU-15 population av-
erage but with trading partners.
The intensity of CEECs’ trade with the EU-15 of a sector is measured by an
export share which is the number of exports towards the EU-15 (taken from the
STAN Bilateral Trade Database) divided by gross output.
We can see from the ﬁrst row of table 1 that real wages increased at least
double as fast in the CEEC-4 than in the EU-15 between 1997 and 2005. This
increase is a process that consists of two components: First, the level of wages
in each sector may change. Secondly, there might be labor mobility between
these sectors and workers may move from low wage sectors to higher wage
sectors. Therefore it is of interest which of those two effects caused the wage
increase. To ﬁnd out I re-calculated the 2005 real wage for all countries but
8In the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary the data is available from 1995 onwards,
for Poland starting in 1996. However, to make the results comparable, the main focus is on the
period 1997 to 2005.
6used the 1997 employment structure instead of the 2005 employment structure
as weight. The results can be seen in the middle row of table 1 and show that
keeping the employment structure ﬁxed at the 1997 level, the wage increases
are still substantial and therefore wages must have risen mainly due to wage
increases within each industry. Slovakia is the only case where wages with ﬁxed
employment structure have risen more than when compared to the actual
employment structure, indicating that a slight move of laborers towards lower
wage sectors has taken place. On the other hand, the difference in the de-
velopment of wages with ﬁxed employment structure compared to the actual
development was quite dramatic for the EU-15 countries, indicating a redeploy-
ment of workers towards sectors with higher wages. From the data analyzed so
far, we do not know, why this happened. Note, however, that the HOS frame-
work predicts a higher labor demand in the high-skill industries of the EU after
trade liberalization with a “less advanced” region/country.
CZ H PL SK EU
avg. real wage growth p.a. 3.81 % 2.92 % 1.42 % 1.63 % 0.55 %
avg. real wage growth p.a.
if employment structure ﬁxed 3.49 % 2.39 % 1.22 % 1.77 % 0.21 %
1997 living standard index 0.409 0.450 0.566 0.374 1
2005 living standard index 0.565 0.547 0.606 0.480 1
Table 1: DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING WAGES 1997-2005
Despite this catching-up in real wages, living standards of employees widely
diverged between CEEC-4 and EU-15 countries as can be seen from the third
row of table 1 and from ﬁgure 1. Living standard of any CEEC-4 country is mea-
sured here in terms of the corresponding living standard in EU-15 trading part-
ners:




where wCEEC is the nominal wage in the CEEC-country, wEU 15 is the nominal
EU-15 reference wage and PPP measures purchasing power parities. In 2005,
Polish employees reached about 60.6 % of the living standard of its EU-15 trad-
ing partners, in the case of Slovakia, this index was only 48 %.
Furthermore, from ﬁgure 2 it can also be seen, that the signiﬁcance of EU-
15 trade indeed drastically increased for the CEEC-4 during the period under
consideration. For all countries but Poland the share of manufacturing exports
towards the EU-15 (as percentage of the manufacturing gross product) adds
up to about 40 %, in the larger Polish economy it amounts to slightliy below 30
%. An interesting development of CEEC-4 export pattern towards the EU-15 is
revealed by a look at ﬁgure 3 which depicts the percentage change of man-
7Figure 1: DEVELOPMENT OF INDEX OF LIVING STANDARDS OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOY-
EES
ufacturing exports to the EU-15 (as a percentage of manufacturing gross pro-
duction) between 1997 and 2005 by skill intensity (according to the classiﬁca-
tion given in table 2 in Appendix A): We can see that the relevance of high-skill
and medium-high-skill intensive exports has dramatically risen for all countries,
especially for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while the signiﬁcance of less skill
intensive exports remained fairly unchanged (or even decreased in the case of
Hungary). This descriptive ﬁnding reveals inadequacies of the (neo-)classical
HOS framework in explaining the driving forces in the trade-income relationship
and is in accordance with the empirical ﬁndings of Dulleck et al (2005).
3 Econometric analysis
3.1 Model structure
To further investigate the trade-income relationship, I use the econometric model
Dyi;t = ai+ ˆ b1Dxi;t +Xi;t ˆ b + ˆ ei;t; (1)
where y stands for real wages, x is the export share, subscripts i and t stand
for sector and year, respectively, X is a matrix of other variables which are ex-
plained in table 3 in Appendix A, the ˆ b’s are are (linear) estimators for a corre-
8Figure 2: CEECS’ MANUFACTURING EXPORTS TOWARDS THE EU-15 (AS PERCENTAGE OF
MANUFACTURING OUTPUT)
Figure 3: DEVELOPMENT OF SKILL INTENSITIES IN CEEC-4 EXPORTS TOWARDS THE EU-15,
1997-2005
9lation between dependent and explanatory variables, and ˆ e ˙  N(0;s2).
The model is formulated in ﬁrst differences (indicated by D) since neither a
cross-sector augmented Dickey-Fuller test (CADF; based on Im et al., 1995/2003,
and enhanced by Pesaran, 2007) nor a Fisher-Test (as proposed by Maddala/Wu,
1999) based on the Dickey-Fuller and/or the Phillips-Perron(1988) statistics allow
to clearly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the real wages and export
shares for all countries. A possible cointegration relationship was investigated
using a Westerlund (2007) test for cointegration. Again, the null hypothesis of
no cointegration could not been rejected.910 Note, that a model in ﬁrst dif-
ferences with a sector-speciﬁc constant corresponds to a model in levels with
sector-speciﬁc linear time trends.11
3.2 Main results of the full model
The results of the full model are reproduced in table 4 in Appendix B. Gener-
ally, we can see that the inﬂuence of the export share on real wages is not
statistically signiﬁcant (except for the ﬁrst and third lag in Hungary and the ﬁrst
lag in all countries together). If we look at all countries together (sixth column),
where standard errors are smaller than the estimated coefﬁcients at least, we
can see that the ﬁrst lag of the export share has a signiﬁcantly negative impact
9Results are not reproduced here to save space but can be found in Wacker (2009).
10The conventional IPS statistic requires T > 5 and if a trend is included T > 6 (cf. Im et al., 2003:
59). CADF further decreases the degrees of freedom since supplementary lagged values of the
cross-section means y and differences of their actual values are used in the regression. Since the
time series under consideration is relatively short (T=8), the variance will be high and therefore the
results will not be very robust, so that rejection of H0 is unlikely. The same is true for the Westerlund
test for (no) cointegration. If applied for the period 1995-2005 for the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland (in levels), which increases the degrees of freedom, H0 can be rejected for all three
countries for Westerlund’s Gt statistic on the 1 % level and for the Czech Republic for the Pt
statistic on the 5 % level if a trend and a constant are included. It is likely therefore that there
indeed exists a long-run cointegration relationship between trade and wages but we might be
unable to robustly observe this in the short period under consideration. Note that Westerlund’s
a statistics are generally more appropriate than his t statistics if T is substantially larger than N
(Westerlund, 2007: 722) which is not the case here.
11The assumption of sector speciﬁc time trends is not unlikely since (especially skill-speciﬁc)
wage differentials were very low in centrally planned economies and thus wages in industries with
higher skill intensities are expected to rise faster than others for example. Empirically, normality of
the ﬁtted residuals is a criterion to dicriminate between a sector-speciﬁc or an overall constant. A
Jarque-Bera test shows that we can easily reject the null hypothesis that the residuals of a pooled
OLS model are drawn from a normal distribution on the 1 % level for all countries. On the other
hand, when using a ﬁxed-effect estimator (as suggested in equation 1) we cannot reject the null
on a 10 % level for Hungary and Poland, and on a 1 % level for the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Accordingly, even though pooled OLS will be consistent and efﬁcient under its assumptions, also
both model selection criteria AIC and BIC prefer ﬁxed effects over pooled OLS in each case.
10on real wages,12 but as lags increase, the impact turns more positive (but is sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant at conventional conﬁdence levels). As one would expect,
unemployment has a negative impact on wages and the higher the gap in real
wages (compared to EU-15 trading partners), the higher is the wage increase
in the CEECs (both signiﬁcant at the 1 % level). While the latter is generally an
indication of convergence, it does not mean that this is necessarily related to
trade.
3.3 Model selection
In a next step, I applied backward model selection using the conservative13
information criterion by Akaike (AIC).14
Note, that model selection has potentially considerable effect on inference
(P¨ otscher, 1991), so reported test statistics do not have much to say in this con-
text. The use of AIC instead of BIC is motivated by the fact that, strictly speaking,
the Bayesian approach (i.e. BIC) is not applicable to model selection “if one
takes the view that operating models are generally vastly more complex than
any model one is likely to consider ﬁtting to them in practice” (Zucchini, 2000:
54), while AIC (even though derived under the assumption that the operating,
i.e. ‘true’, model belongs to the approximating familiy of models) and the asso-
ciated frequentist approach accepts “that the approximating models are not
necessarily the real thing” and generally goes for the best ﬁt (ibid.) and the
closeness to the truth instead the truth itself (Forster, 2000: 213).15 In the present
context it would be naive to assume that the simple model estimated is in fact
the truth determining complex wage structures.
12This does not necessarily contradict the conclusions derived by Stolper and Samuelson (1941;
1948, 1949), since of course nobody “ever denied that the workers employed in the particular
industry which loses a tariff could be hurt in the short-run, but according to the classical theory, in
the long-run there would be an increased demand for those commodities in which the country
had a comparative advantage” (Stolper/Samuelson, 1941: 59).
13Using a conservative selection strategy, the possibility of selecting a model that does not
nest the minimal true model tends to zero asymptotically, i.e. only correct models are selected
but possibly over-parameterized ones (cf. Leeb/P¨ otscher, 2005: 23/46, Note 6, and 35ff and
Leeb/P¨ otscher, 2008: Section 1.2.2).
14I consider every model Mr : M0  Mr  Mall \Mr  Mall; where M0 only includes the ﬁrst lag
of the EU-15 export variable (and a constant) as an explanatory variable (i.e. this variable is
protected) and Mall includes the full set of variables, as a potential candidate model. I start
with the full model and eliminate one variable respectively. If a lagged variable is excluded,
any higher lag of the same variable is excluded too. Out of these eleven submodels anyone
that has a lower AIC is considered as a potential candidate model. Out of these, again one
variable is eliminated respectively and the procedure is repeated until no further decrease in
AIC is possible. From all remaining models the one with the lowest AIC is chosen.
15Note that Wasserman (2000: 103), however, qualiﬁes this statement.
11The results are presented in table 5 in Appendix B. We cannot make clear
statements about the signiﬁcance of the estimators since standard errors are
underevaluated. One can note that signiﬁcance levels of the export share do
not increase considerably anyways. But the interesting thing is that model se-
lection leaves all three lags of the variable in the best model (except for Czech
Republic). This is some evidence that export share might indeed be a good
predictor for wage levels. Again, we see the same qualitative pattern as in the
full model (which is also true for the unemployment rate16 and the wage gap).
3.4 Estimating the long-run correlation
In a ﬁnal step I estimate a long-run relationship by using averages of the vari-
ables over several years. Thus, the dependent variable is the percentage in-
crease of real wages from 1998-2005. The explanatory variables are the per-
centage change in the export share (towards the EU-15), in the unemployment
rate,17 and in import penetration. These changes are calculated over the pe-
riod 1997-2004 to allow for a lag structure of at least one year. The real wage
gap between the CEEC-4 and the EU-15 enters the equation in 1997 levels since
sectors where the wage was especially low in 1997 are expected to experience
higher wage increases within the following years. We can see from table 6 that
this expectation is fulﬁlled since the parameter estimate of this variable is < 0
(and signiﬁcant at the 10 % level at least for Poland, Slovakia and the combi-
nation of all countries). Also operating surpluses and R & D expenses enter the
equation not in long-run differences but in averages over the period 1997-2004
since they are assumed to have a persistent inﬂuences on wages.
The results for the long-run inﬂuence of the variables on the real wage in
the full model are presented in table 6 (Appendix B). As can be seen there,
the long-run inﬂuence of exports towards the EU-15 is only signiﬁcant in Poland
(at the 5 % level and positive). Thus, in Poland sectors that got more export-
oriented towards the EU-15 during the period 1997-2004 had signiﬁcantly higher
increases in real wages between 1998 and 2005. A positive relationship is also
suggested for Hungary but is not statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10 % level) there.
Negative, but also insigniﬁcant, relationships are suggested for the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia.
16The unemployment rate is eliminated from most single-country models which might be due
to the fact that it is not sector speciﬁc.
17The change in the unemployment rate is only included in the pool of all countries since it is
not sector-speciﬁc. Therefore it would simply act as a constant on the country level.
12Backward model selection leads to the models presented in table 7. For
Slovakia, no submodel obtained a better AIC than the full model and therefore
the latter is equal to the best AIC model. Again, we can see a positive rela-
tionship between exports towards the EU-15 and real wages in Hungary and
Poland that is only signiﬁcant in Poland (at the 5 % level). In the Czech Republic
the relationship is negative but far from being signiﬁcant. The same is true if all
countries are pooled together. In this speciﬁcation the impact of unemploy-
ment on real wages is signiﬁcantly negative (at the 10 % level) and also sectors
of the CEEC-4 which lagged further behind the wage level of the EU-15 had
signiﬁcantly higer increases in real wages.
Since it might be a strong assumption that the constant (i.e. the linear time
trend of the wage variable that is not explained by the variables in the model)
as well as the parameter of the inﬂuence of the export share on real wages are
equal across all countries, I included dummy variables for the countries in the
full pooled model (model ‘all(2)’ in table 7) and furthermore interacted them
with the share of exports towards the EU-15.18 The obtained results are similar to
the results from table 6: The share of exports towards the EU-15 has a negative
impact on real wages in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while the inﬂuence
is positive in Hungary and Poland. Now, Hungary is the only country where this
inﬂuence is statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1 % level). Furthermore, the initial gap
between the CEECs and the EU-15 in real wage and operating surpluses have
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on real wages. When the best AIC submodel is selected
(column ‘all(3)’ in table 7), the impact of exports on real wages in the Slovak
Republic turns positive but remains highly insigniﬁcant. All other results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
4 Summary, conclusions, and perspectives
Using the OECD STAN database for twelve manufacturing industries in Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia for the time period 1997-2005 I thus
ﬁnd no clear relationship between the share of exports towards the EU-15 and
the development of real wages. Generally, real wages have stronger increased
in these CEEC-4 than in the EU-15 during this period but there still exists a seri-
ous difference in living standards of employees. Furthermore, it is unlikely that
the (neo-)classical arguments of trade theory explain the full story of the forces
underlying this process of convergence: Contrary to the predictions of the HOS
18It should be clear that three country dummy variables account for all four countries and
then also the unemployment rate becomes obsolete as an explanatory variable. Since all four
country dummies are interacted with the export share, also the overall export share is no longer
needed.
13framework, especially medium-high and high technology intensive goods have
gained magnitude in the CEEC-4 export composition (towards the EU-15). ‘The
increasing returns revolution in trade’ theory (Krugman, 2009) and the inﬂuence
of multinational ﬁrms might well account for this trade pattern. With these ex-
tensions made, however, the irrevocableness of the Stolper-Samuelson and the
factor price equalization theorem no longer exist. Even though Helpman and
Krugman (1985: 59-63, 190-195) showed that factor price equalization also may
hold when increasing returns and differentiated products exist, further restric-
tions have to be assumed and the FPE set may become very small and thus
factor endowments have to be very similar in both countries and/or produced
commodities have to use production factors in very different proportions (cf.
Samuelson, 1948: 175, 178-180; and Krugman, 1995: 359f).
Another central point of the Stolper-Samuelson as well as the FPE theorem
is the perfect mobility of factors across sectors which reﬂects the general equi-
librium structure of trade theory. To assume such a perfect mobility for labor
markets within even several years might be a too strong requirement to empir-
ically observe FPE. On the other hand, factor incomes of capital - which is not
only mobile across sectors in the medium-run but was also mobile across coun-
tries in the case of CEEC-4 - have virtually equalized during the period under
investigation (see the behavior of the short-term interest rate in ﬁgure 4). Trade
theorists might thus argue: In the long run, also factor income of labor may
equalize. However, if that takes two generations, the employees concerned
may rightly argue that “in the long run we are all dead” (Keynes, 1923: 80).
Also, from a policy perspective, a trade theory that afﬁrms that a trade liberal-
ization two generations before has been advantageous to actual employees
is of limited practical value to actual policy makers. What might be done to
overcome this potential problem?
Empirically, it might be promising to devote more attention to differences in
the trade-income relationship by labor mobility differences. The ﬁndings pre-
sented here for example, suggest that this relationship may seriously vary be-
tween Hungary and Poland (positive relation in the medium run) on the one
hand and the Czech Republic and Slovakia on the other. While the textbook
distinction between “big bang” and gradual transition strategy fails to account
for these differences (Poland as well as the Czech Republic adopted a big
bang strategy while Hungary is a textbook example of a gradualist strategy; cf.
Roland, 2000: 11ff), different geographic aspects of labor mobility may to some
extent explain the differences: manufacturing production in Poland is highly
concentrated in the Silesian Voivodeship; in Hungary, it is also highly concen-
trated in Central and Western Transdanubia. This geographical concentration
14Figure 4: SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
of manufacturing production might increase mobility of workers across sectors
(since workers do not have to move in order to change job) while the regional
dispersion of manufacturing production all over the country in Slovakia and
the Czech Republic - countries that have not had the same history of market-
oriented reforms prior to 1990 - might disable workers in stagnating and de-
clining sectors to ﬁnd work in industries that are expanding due to increasing
foreign demand. Therefore, investigating the effects of trade capacities on a
more disaggregated level in future studies might shed more light on the trade-
income relationship. But also actually developing panel cointegration tech-
niques might lead to more meaningful results as the time dimension in CEECs’
data observations grows larger.
If the suspicion of missing labor market mobility gets substantiated, then
from a policy perspective it seems reliable to undertake efforts to increase la-
bor mobility so that employees can take advantage of the gains from trade.
Unfortunately, this matter has been largely ignored due to theoretical reasons
and public budget constraints. Not only infrastructural and housing policy19 are
among the potential spheres of action, but also education and social security
that allows for labor market transitions without major short-term losses in living
standards.
On the theoretical front, evidence of locally mobile but nationally rigid labor
19Mobility of employees in CEECs was also handicapped by overpriced housing in developing
areas (cf. Nesporova, 1999: 51)
15markets might well be a shot in the arm of attempts to bring forward the incor-
poration of economic geography into trade theory. It is questionable, however,
if such models with increased complexity lead to such clear, deﬁnite, and ex-
tensive statements about the effects of trade liberalization on factor prices as
the Stolper-Samuelson and the FPE theorem. If it increases the adequacy of
trade theory, it is a price one should probably be willing to pay since the in-
disputability of these theorems suffers the same problem as all mathematical
theorems do: “as far as ... [they] apply to reality, they are not certain; and if
they are certain they don’t apply to reality” (Einstein, [1921], 2005: 157).
16Appendix A
Industry ISIC Code skill
Rev. 3
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 15-16 3 L
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 17-19 4 L
Wood and products of wood & cork 20 5 L
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 21-22 6 L
Chemicals & chemical products 24 8 MH
Rubber & plastics products 25 9 ML
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 10 ML
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 27-28 11 ML
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 29 12 MH
Electrical & optical equipment 30-33 13 H
Transport equipment 34-35 14 H
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 36-37 15 L
Note: The classiﬁcation of the skill intensity in the very right column follows OECD (2007: 220):
L = low technology; ML = medium-low technology; MH = medium-high technology;
H = high technology. Industries 13 and 14 have been assigned to high technology
industry according to the subsections included in them.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dependent variable: d.(real wage)
CZ H PL SK all
d.exp share 7,829 -1,148,858** 3,489 -26,448 -1,650**
(1 lag) (39,128) (487,104) (18,645) (61,961) (719.8)
d.exp share 7,499 23,969 -13,220 -46,625 -712.2
(2 lags) (40,368) (337,318) (16,518) (79,421) (599.3)
d.exp share -9,322 568,228* 14,877 19,421 588.8
(3 lags) (16,305) (326,264) (13,776) (26,129) (573.8)
d.unempl -127,561 -545,245 54,461 132,753 -9,949***
(1 lag) (89,781) (4,495,944) (37,016) (142,947) (3,370)
real wage gap 0.5132 -63.1*** -0.8384** -3.34 -0.2593***
(1 lag) (0.9510) (23.0) (0.3783) (2.67) (0.0371)
d.mpen 1,305 36,728* -1,187.887 35,957 23.06
(1 lag) (40,032) (18,676) (17,502) (50,121) (33.22)
d.mpen -13,759 7,637 12,241 42,352 5.24
(2 lags) (41,752) (11,598.28) (13,906) (57,844) (29.73)
d.ops 3.34e-07 -0.000259 3.67e-08 -1.16e-07 7.12e-08
(1 lag) (8.98e-06) (0.000269) (1.78e-06) (0.0000306) (2.20e-06)
ops -0.0000149 0.0000575 2.68e-07 0.0000183 2.54e-06
(1 lag) (0.0000102) (0.0001673) (1.56e-06) (0.0000307) (1.86e-06)
d.R&D -2.20 -27.9 -0.1904943 -6.97 2.50
(1 lag) (4.32) (17.6) (7.497906) (21.82) (6.16)
d.R&D 3.26 -24.76 -16.1 19.6 -3.99
(2 lags) (3.30) (20.41) (11.12) (20.83) (6.98)
d.R&D -8.31** -4.84 -17.04 -3.93 -10.47*
(3 lags) (3.60) (19.32) (10.26) (16.20) (6.06)
constant 32,144 -1,818,200*** -26,065** -105,111 -7,613***
(29,986.65) (661,762.8) (11,422) (83,775) (1,120)
Prob F-stat 0.1225 0.0064 0.0655 0.7936 0.0
within R2 0.2400 0.3468 0.5057 0.1759 0.3582
AIC 1,703 2,247 819 1,280 3,990
Obs 84 84 48 60 264
1997-2005 (98 for SK), Sector 7 excluded. Standard Errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table 4: FD FE ESTIMATION RESULTS (FULL MODEL)
19dependent variable: d.(real wage)
CZ H PL SK all
d.exp share 7,492 -1,122,453** 8,485 16,330 -1,355***
(1 lag) (17,588) (454,739) (6,905) (21,129) (492.7)
d.exp share X 190,731 4,305 6,745 -737.0
(2 lags) X (212,489) (8,155) (25,167) (486.1)
d.exp share X 597,576** 31,651*** 25,586 573.2
(3 lags) X (242,615) (10,410) (22,135) (549.3)
d.unempl -145,691** X X X -11,007***
(1 lag) (72,563) X X X (3,310)
real wage gap X -67.67*** -0.3793* -3.97* -0.2649***
(1 lag) X (19.82) (0.1910) (2.12) (0.0363)
d.mpen X 35,481** X X X
(1 lag) X (17,326) X X X
d.ops X X 6.25e-07 X -2.59e-07
(1 lag) X X (1.00e-06) X (2.12e-06)
ops -0.000013** X X X 3.38e-06*
(1 lag) (5.64e-06) X X X (1.78e-06)
d.R&D -1.71 -17.78 X X X
(1 lag) (3.92) (13.72) X X X
d.R&D 3.49 X X X X
(2 lags) (3.01) X X X X
d.R&D -7.96** X X X X
(3 lags) (3.29) X X X X
constant 15,793*** -1,959,282*** -12,207** -121,745* -7,811***
(2,806) (587,919) (5,546) (66,310) (1,094)
Prob F-stat 0.0075 0.0003 0.0092 0.3637 0.0
within R2 0.2275 0.3148 0.3761 0.0917 0.3426
AIC 1,692 2,239 816.3 1,269 3,987
JB 0.0215 0.7430 0.7228 0.0304 0.0208
Obs 84 84 48 60 264
1997-2005 (1998-2005 for SK), Sector 7 excluded. Standard Errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Jarque-Bera reports p-values for normality test of residuals.
Table 5: FD FE ESTIMATION RESULTS (BEST AIC MODELS)
20dependent variable: D98 05real wage
CZ H PL SK all
D97 04 exp share -0.0137203 0.3047 0.0559114** -0.0265299 -0.0430825
(0.0487254) (0.2509) (0.013508) (0.0671819) (0.0535559)
D97 04 unempl X X X X -0.0619558
X X X X (0.0600708)
real wage gap -2.28e-06 -0.0000154 -9.62e-06* -0.0000142** -7.80e-06*
(2.80e-06) (0.0000118) (4.01e-06) (4.83e-06) (4.57e-06)
D97 04 MPEN -0.0129384 0.4924 -0.1095 0.2733 0.1345
(0.1157) (0.5100) (0.0494) (0.1916) (0.1611)
OPS
97 04 -0.0178824 -4.40* -0.7938* -0.8868 -0.9514
(% of gross prod.) (0.4178781) (2.01) (0.2810) (0.7545) (0.7007)
R&D
97 04 2.47 13.22 -2.51 -118,238 10.28*
(% of gross prod.) (3.35) (12.30) (14.13) (83,228) (5.65)
constant 0.2584** 0.1456 -0.1377 -0.2384 0.0703555
(0.0797) (0.3836) (0.0996) (0.1745) (0.1617761)
observations 12 12 9 12 45
R2 0.4973 0.7005 0.9657 0.6325 0.2872
prob F-stat 0.4137 0.1206 0.0209 0.2015 0.0356
AIC -41.5152 -4.412561 -39.19999 -21.67237 -31.12484
JB 0.0 0.0139 0.0461 0.0 0.0
OLS estimation, excluding sector 7
Signiﬁcance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table 6: LONG-RUN CORRELATION (FULL MODELS)
21dependent variable: D98 05real wage
CZ H PL all all(2) all(3)
D97 04 exp share -0.0124933 0.3890 0.0520576** -0.008981 X X
(0.025732) (0.2302) (0.0173286) (0.0463253) X X
D97 04 unempl X X X -0.1069* X X
X X X (0.0573317) X X
real wage gap X -0.0000206* -9.07e-06*** -0.0000115*** -8.32e-06** -8.51e-06***
X (9.44e-06) (2.28e-06) (3.92e-06) (3.29e-06) (2.65e-06)
D97 04 MPEN X X -0.1328* X 0.0757959 X
X X (0.0689) X (0.1149141) X
OPS
97 04 X -2.82* -0.6197 X -0.9742* -0.8250*
(% of gross prod.) X (1.50) (0.4075) X (0.4985) (0.4564)
R&D
97 04 4.34** X X X 1.34
(% of gross prod.) (1.66) X X X (4.31)
constant 0.3115*** -0.0262775 -0.1368 -0.0979964 -0.0438819 -0.0574905
(0.0159) (0.2510) (0.0930239) (0.1130082) (0.1313139) (0.1068122)
CZ X X X X 0.2627* 0.2660***
(dummy) X X X X (0.0704994) (0.0654068)
H X X X X 0.0905609 0.1028*
(dummy) X X X X (0.065151) (0.059471)
PL X X X X -0.0806327 -0.0581152
(dummy) X X X X (0.0769566) (0.0658328)
expshare X X X X -0.0942253 -0.0672449
(CZ) X X X X (0.0981182) (0.0883706)
exp share X X X X 0.4731218*** 0.4880513***
(H) X X X X (0.1445702) (0.1366209)
exp share X X X X 0.0349513 0.0315527
(PL) X X X X (0.0508951) (0.0446638)
exp share X X X X -0.0145322 0.0005896
(SK) X X X X (0.0659978) (0.0597317)
observations 12 12 12 48 45 48
R2 0.4369 0.6191 0.8284 0.2075 0.7030 0.7044
prob F-stat 0.0754 0.0431 0.0082 0.0158 0.0 0.0
AIC -46.15499 -5.528724 -41.26866 -35.4272 -60.5143 -70.77059
JB 0.0 0.0988 0.0199 0.1592 0.0 0.0
OLS estimation, excluding sector 7
Signiﬁcance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table 7: LONG-RUN CORRELATION (BEST AIC MODELS)
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